LUIS A. ESTEVES, PHD
MAIS MANCUR OLSON, MAIS ELINOR OSTROM
"COLLECTIVE ACTION TO AVOID CATASTROPHE: WHEN COUNTRIES SUCCEED, WHEN THEY FAIL, AND WHY"
By Scott Barrett (SIPA, Columbia University)
Global Policy, Volume7, IssueS1, May 2016: Pages 45-55
https://lnkd.in/ep_kuPh
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
# The ability of countries to organize to avoid catastrophes depends critically on uncertainty about the threshold, or tipping point, for catastrophic change.
# When this uncertainty is small, avoiding catastrophe requires coordination – something countries are very good at doing.
# When this uncertainty is large, collective action requires enforcement of a cooperative agreement – something countries are very bad at doing.
# Enforcement can be enhanced by countries ceding some sovereignty – and yet, historically, countries have been unwilling to do this without having first experienced a catastrophic outcome.
# In some cases it may be possible to devise strategies that transform a collective‐action problem into a coordination game.
"COLLECTIVE ACTION TO AVOID CATASTROPHE: WHEN COUNTRIES SUCCEED, WHEN THEY FAIL, AND WHY"
By Scott Barrett (SIPA, Columbia University)
Global Policy, Volume7, IssueS1, May 2016: Pages 45-55
https://lnkd.in/ep_kuPh
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
# The ability of countries to organize to avoid catastrophes depends critically on uncertainty about the threshold, or tipping point, for catastrophic change.
# When this uncertainty is small, avoiding catastrophe requires coordination – something countries are very good at doing.
# When this uncertainty is large, collective action requires enforcement of a cooperative agreement – something countries are very bad at doing.
# Enforcement can be enhanced by countries ceding some sovereignty – and yet, historically, countries have been unwilling to do this without having first experienced a catastrophic outcome.
# In some cases it may be possible to devise strategies that transform a collective‐action problem into a coordination game.
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